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CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND CHANGE
Heinz Klug*
RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (Harvard Univ. Press 2010). Pp.
314. Hardcover. $45.00.
GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (Harvard Univ. Press
2010). Pp. 388. Hardcover. $45.00.
MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (Yale Univ. Press 2010). Pp.
208. Cloth. $25.00. Paperback. $16.00.
A third wave of constitution-making in the aftermath of the cold-war expanded the
debate over constitutionalism beyond the small core of countries whose politics were
clearly defined by their constitutional structures and commitments in the post-WWII era.
While this latter day embrace of constitutionalism has been celebrated as an
internalization of a new global commitment to human rights and democracy,' it has also
raised profound questions about the nature and effects of constitutions in law, politics,
and society. The endeavor to address these questions requires defining the scope of
constitutional effects, and determining the appropriate institutional locations and
theoretical frames through which to explore these issues. Three recent books by Ran
Hirschl, 2 Gary Jacobsohn, 3 and Mark Tushnet 4 offer significant contributions towards
meeting this challenge, and provide an opportunity to reflect on earlier and alternative
approaches to the broader questions of why and how constitutions matter beyond revered
documents, courts, and judges.
All three books grapple with these large questions of constitutionalism yet adopt
very different perspectives, providing a wide-angle view of the variety of ways we may
approach these issues. Both Hirschl and Jacobsohn use a comparative methodology to
explore the different questions they raise, while Tushnet's book is meant to be accessible
to a popular audience and is focused more on questioning the prevailing tendency to
understand the United States Constitution through the perspective of the judiciary and
case law. Offering what he terms a "purely descriptive" political analysis, 5 Tushnet is in
fact building on his earlier work on the idea of constitutional orders or regimes. Thus,
instead of the dominant view that the Constitution simply establishes the architecture of
* Evjue-Bascom Professor in Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. See Bruce Ackermann, The Rise of World Constitutionalism,83 VA. L. REv. 771, 785 (1997).
2. RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010).
3. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
4. MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (2010).

5. Id. at 172.
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government and guarantees rights, he argues that the Constitution matters because it
structures politics, and it is change in the politics of the country that in turn shape the
principles and institutions that form the basis of each new constitutional regime.6 In
comparison, Hirschl argues for the recognition of a new legal order, or at least a new
legal form - constitutional theocracy. He argues this new order helps to understand the
co-existence of constitutional systems and the rising tide of theocratic authority that has
undermined the traditional notions of separation of church and state that lie at the heart
of liberal constitutionalism. While the comparative scope and analysis Hirschl brings to
the subject is majestic, his focus remains on the courts, constitutional courts in particular.
Despite his fascinating analysis about the role of constitutional law and courts in
bolstering secular forms of rule,7 and his argument that there is "an intriguing conceptual
affinity between constitutional law and religio[us] law, each with its own constitutive
texts, interpretative hierarchies, and righteous morality alongside earthly interests," 8 the
most interesting question he posits seeks the source of conflict and change "within and
between the religious and the constitutional domains." 9
In challenging the tendency in academia and popular culture to resist a political
understanding of either law or religion,10 Hirschl points to the power of interpretation in
both religion and law as a source of change while making the argument that
understanding the "striking similarities" between these different symbolic systems may
help us to understand how they evolve or "mutate to address social needs, economic
interests, or political aspirations." 1 While individual and collective identities might
seem central to such a symbolic view of law and religion, Hirschl argues against the
assumption of "firm identities and fixed group affiliations,"l2 instead employing the
facts of multiplicity in individual identities as well as intra-group or intra-faith divisions
to emphasize the importance of politics, arguing that these markers of identity "may be
brought to the fore or relegated to lesser status as coalitions shift, elites transform, and
interests change."l3 This de-centering of identity contrasts earlier works, which either
assumed that constitutions play a key role in the creation and evolution of national
identities 14 or challenged the notion of a single identity and instead called for the
recognition of a multiplicity of constitutional identities within particular constitutional
orders. 15 James Tully's argument for the recognition of a multiplicity of identities within
modem constitutionalism seems, in contrast, to resonate with Jacobsohn's conception of
the "disharmonic constitution" in which there exists both "conflicting, even radically

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 132-39, 151.
See HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 50-51.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 208-11.
Id. at 239.
HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 45.
Id.

14. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION

ix (1989) (discussing "the past and potential contributions of American law, especially constitutional law, to
the definition of our national community").
15. See, e.g., JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM INAN AGE OF DIVERSITY 209
(1995).
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inconsistent, ideas," 16 but also a broader constitutional identity - consisting of
"identifiable continuities of meaning within which dissonance and contradiction play
out." 7 For Jacobsohn, the identity of any constitutional order is fundamentally
dependent on the existence of constitutional disharmony, which serves as the catalyst of
change.
All three of these books are premised on the idea that the constitution is not a
particular historic document or even a legal structure but rather a broader regime that is
constituted by a combination of legal commitments, institutions, and continuing political
contestation over ideas and resources. They all offer extraordinary insights into the
structure and functioning of these varied constitutional orders, and they struggle to
elucidate the mechanisms and pathways that have led to either gradual or dramatic
change in different constitutional regimes. It is this common notion of a constitutional
order or regime that raises the question of scale and requires, I believe, further reflection
before we embark on a discussion of the mechanisms of change these contributions
explore. Is constitutionalism a concept best located in a purely philosophical or
normative discussion of appropriate forms of governance, or should we recognize its
historical and institutional dimensions as key aspects of our conceptualization and
debates over the place and role of constitutions? Should our focus remain within the four
corners of each constitutional document and the particular history and culture of the legal
system in which it functions, or should we locate our discussion within the broader
conception of constitutional orders and the political realms these orders constitute? In an
earlier book, Mark Tushnet focused explicitly on the idea of constitutional orders,
arguing that by "constitutionalorder (or regime)," he meant "a reasonably stable set of
institutions through which a nation's fundamental decisions are made over a sustained
period, and the principles that guide those decisions." 18 Despite their different foci it is
this broader enquiry into the nature of constitutional orders and their changing character,
through the formation of distinct constitutional forms and identities, that defines the scale
of analysis common to all three of these texts.
The idea of a constitutional order or regime is particularly important to discussions
over constitutional identity, as well as questions of diversity and conflict that might
shape the trajectory of change from one regime to the next. Adopting and exploring the
idea of changing constitutional orders, Tushnet advanced what amounted to a theory of
constitutional evolutionalism in which changing political and social conditions give rise
to more fundamental changes in the underlying constitutional order. In contrast to Bruce
Ackerman's notion of constitutional moments, which views the founding, the post-civil
war amendments, and the New Deal as periods of constitutional change outside of
"normal politics," 1 9 Tushnet's idea of a constitutional order, constituted by a "dominant
set of institutions and principles" 20 allowed for an understanding of constitutional
change through processes of gradual construction and transformation. Instead of being
16. JACOBSOHN, supra note 3, at 1, 3-4 (quoting and discussing Laurence H. Tribe, The Idea of the
Constitution:A Metaphor-morphosis,37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 170, 173 (1987).
17. Id. at 4.
18. MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 1 (2003).
19. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: I FOUNDATIONS 58-59, 230-65 (1991).
20. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 2.
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imbued with moments of higher politics or revolutionary transformation, 2 1 Tushnet
introduced a more dynamic notion of constitutional development in the United States.
Furthermore, he rejected a purely court focused approach and instead adopted an
inclusive institutional perspective, viewing political parties and other branches of the
national government as part of a constitutional order. Key to his conception of a
constitutional order, as opposed to a "mere[] political [order]," was the idea that the
constitutional order is a combination of institutions and principles. 22
This inclusive perspective was not limited to Tushnet's analysis of what constitutes
a constitutional order. It extended to include the idea that the guiding principles of any
particular constitutional order are reflected not only in the legal and philosophical
principles articulated in judicial opinions, but also in the statutes and policies adopted
and pronounced by the legislature and executive respectively.23 Thus, he identifies
Franklin D. Roosevelt's State of the Union message in 1944, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Medicare as defining the "guiding principles of
the [New Deal-Great Society] constitutional order," which he argues prevailed in the
United States from the 1930s to the 1980s.24 In his discussion of "why the constitution
matters," Tushnet takes this understanding of a constitutional order to its logical
conclusion by arguing that the Constitution itself matters "because it provides a structure
for our politics,"25 and not because the Supreme Court has the last word on interpretation
or that the fundamental rights and policies upon which most American citizens rely are
either guaranteed by the Constitution or are the product of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution.26
While Tushnet makes a convincing argument for viewing the constitutional history
of the United States as a dynamic process of change, he also acknowledges that it is more
difficult to pin down the exact elements of any new order. In his 2003 book, The New
Constitutional Order, Tushnet identified four possible constitutional regimes over the
course of the twentieth century: two of these were historical, the pre-New Deal order and
the New Deal-Great Society order, while the remaining two represent what Tushnet
identified as the constitutional order of the "present" time and a potential future order.
The identification of two new orders, present and future, provided a fascinating
perspective on what seemed to be Tushnet's own internal debate over whether the
"present" represented a consolidated constitutional order or a transitional period between
the most recent past order - the New Deal-Great Society order - and a future order
which he characterized as the Reagan-Gingrich-Bush order. Tushnet resolved this
question, at the time, by arguing that the "present" may be identified as a specific
constitutional order characterized institutionally by a "political structure center[ed] on a
government divided between two ideologically opposed but internally unified parties,"
and governing principles that "are chastened versions of the principles of the New Deal-

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id at 3.
Id. at 1.
See id. at 4-5.
Id. at 1, 4-5.
TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 1.
See id at 1-17.
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Great Society constitutional order."27 While the challenge for Tushnet was to identify
the particular mix of institutions and guiding principles that together constitute each
particular constitutional order, the idea of successive constitutional regimes requires us
to focus on the specific mechanisms of change that might drive these shifts.
Focused on how to resolve the problem of identifying a specific constitutional
order, or each new constitutional order, Tushnet argued that it depended on the idea of
consolidation. He noted at the time that by his own definition, constitutional orders "have
to be reasonably stable" 28 and that determining that a new order has come into being
requires the identification of a combination of "novel guiding principles with distinctive
institutional arrangements." 29 Yet he also acknowledged that at any moment in time,
different elements of past, present, and future orders are likely to co-exist. Most of The
New ConstitutionalOrder is focused on resolving this tension with Tushnet considering
and distinguishing, to varying degrees, different theories and arguments suggesting either
that a revolutionary change had taken place - in the form of a Reaganite revolution or that the "present" represented a continuing yet unspecified transition, in which it was
possible to identify both distinctive institutional characteristics and particular guiding
principles which together would characterize the "present" as a distinctive constitutional
order. Overcoming this inherent conceptual difficulty requires us to not only identify
specific markers - institutions and principles - but to also grapple with the question of
change itself.
In Tushnet's argument, change flows from shifting social, economic, and political
conditions, which is surely true, but is also in tension with his more recent argument that
the constitution matters because it provides a structure for politics. If constitutional
regimes change as a consequence of shifting conditions and yet simultaneously structure
politics - the very agency of changing social and economic conditions - then
understanding the mechanisms of change from one constitutional regime to another
becomes a challenge of central importance. It is this challenge that is taken up by Gary
Jacobsohn in his brilliant new book Constitutional Identity. There he seeks to "clarify
and elaborate the concept of constitutional identity," which he sees as the central
challenge of constitutional theory. 30 The reason to take up this challenge is that it
provides, in Jacobsohn's hands, a fascinating and highly sophisticated means of
addressing the central question of constitutional theory: how do constitutional systems
come into being and change over time? Aside from moments of constitution making or
formal amendment, questions of constitutional identity and change often focus
exclusively on the role of the judiciary in interpreting the meaning of the constitution in
the process of deciding individual cases. While judicial decisions remain at the core of
Jacobsohn's empirical analysis, it is his focus on the broader constitutional order that
produces a deeper understanding of the "unique legal and political phenomenon"31 that a
constitution represents. In order to achieve this, Jacobsohn follows Tushnet's earlier

27. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 111.
28. Id. at 96.
29. Id. at 8.
30.

JACOBSOHN, supra note 3, at 33.

31. Id.at 2.
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trajectory and makes an initial, and I would argue, essential distinction between a
constitutional text and "a nation's constitution,"32 which is a much broader realm that
includes the text, institutions, and historical understandings that together constitute a
particular society's constitutional order.
which he says is exemplified by Lawrence
Jacobson Rejects the argument that constitutional identity "cannot be objectively deduced or passively
Tribe discerned in a viewpoint-free way." 33 He instead argues that the key to understanding the
evolving identity of a constitution is the concept of constitutional disharmony, which
allows us to explore the "identifiable continuities of meaning within which dissonance
and contradiction play out in the development of constitutional identity."3 4 From his
perspective, constitutional identity "emerges dialogically and represents a mix of
political aspirations and commitments that are expressive of a nation's past, as well as
the determination of those within the society who seek in some ways to transcend that
past." 35 Noting that a "dialogical path may require reconsideration of the juri-centric
model that has . . . dominated contemporary constitutional theorizing," 36 Jacobsohn

fleshes out two other sources of disharmony that may fuel the continuing transformation
of constitutional identities. On the one hand he points to the tensions that are present
within the constitutional text or structure itself - whether it is the relationship between
different levels of government, federalism, inherent in the compromises made by
constitution-makers, or through changing conceptions of specific elements, such as the
idea of constitutional rights themselves. On the other hand, he concludes his chapter on
"The Quest for a Compelling Unity" by exploring the "second dimension of contestation
- confrontation between constitution and social order." 37 As a result, he concludes that
whether it is contradictory aspirations or tensions between the evolving social structure
and the framework of the constitution, "constitutional identity will be fashioned - and
refashioned - through the struggle over constitutional identity." 38
To understand this dynamic, Jacobsohn points to a distinction between what he
terms preservationist and militant orientations inherent within constitutional texts. He
argues that these orientations reflect the "preservative and transformative elements" 39
that are inherent within all constitutional orders, and in some cases constrain social
change while in others provide a challenge to the existing social structure. Even the idea
of continuity inherent in the preservationist. or prescriptive form "embodies an
adversarial component - 'continuities of conflict' - that connects it to the historical
narrative within which it unfolds while preventing it from becoming moribund." 40 Thus,
for example, Jacobsohn discusses the evolution of constitutional identity in Ireland, and
argues that the changing status of religion in the constitutional order is a product of the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
JACOBSOHN, supranote 3, at 7.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 214.
JACOBSOHN, supra note 3, at 19.
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"disharmonic tension" between these preservationist and transformative elements. 41
Using examples from Irish and Indian jurisprudence, Jacobsohn also explores the
question of constitutional amendments and demonstrates how underlying political
principles and the character of each constitution, as well as the particular conflicts, frame
the relationship between continuity and change.
Finally, Jacobsohn turns to the relationship between the family and the state,
showing how the institution of the family and its role in the formation of social identity
is implicated in the disharmonic tensions that help to shape constitutional identity. He
uses this lens to explore the deeply disharmonic tensions inherent in Israel's
constitutional commitment to maintaining a Jewish and democratic state and its
implications for citizenship, immigration, and claims for family reunification within the
state. While Jacobsohn focuses on family law and religious commitments as examples of
disharmonies that contribute to the formation of constitutional identities,42 Hirschl
focuses on the role of constitutional institutions, primarily the courts, in co-opting
religion, or in the case of indigenous or customary law in South Africa, as an example of
courts being used to co-opt or secularize "traditional" or collective identities that are
inconsistent with "universalist" or dominant notions of rights. 43 The South African case
provides an interesting way to explore the conceptual links between these different ways
of theorizing the role of constitutions.
From the perspective of Tushnet's argument, there is no doubting the claim that the
South African constitutions of 1993 and 1996, which enabled the democratic transition
from Apartheid, were at their core a set of principles and institutions that structured the
politics of post-apartheid South Africa. Yet, the ability of legal institutions, including the
Constitutional Court, the Chapter 9 State Institutions Supporting Democracy, or even the
Legislature to effectively corral the power of the dominant political party, the African
National Congress, remains uncertain. At the same time, the 1996 Constitution may be
clearly identified in Jacobsohn's terms as transformative, even as it maintains the
existence of deeply disharmonic elements - including the protection of property rights
and the duty to redistribute land, as well as gender equality and the recognition of
traditional authorities and "indigenous" law. Hirschl, on the other hand, sees the
Constitutional Court as a guardian of the civil religion of the constitution, working as a
secularizing agent to co-opt these traditional elements. He concludes that the
"Constitutional Court has consistently limited the scope and application of this onceunrecognized system of legal meaning creation."44 These cases, involving family and
citizenship in the new democratic state may, however, be better understood as reflecting
Jacobsohn's disharmonic elements in that they serve both to challenge the pre-existing
order as well as to pose potential limits on the transformational promise of the new
constitutional regime.
In the last few years the Constitutional Court in South Africa has decided a group
of cases that holds profound consequences for the hopes and aspirations of the majority

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 214.
See JACOBSOHN, supra note 3, at 353.
HIRSCHL, supranote 2, at 185-95.
Id. at 187.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2011

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5
48

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47:41

of South Africans. These cases include challenges to the "customary law of succession"
on the grounds of gender discrimination; 45 the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Ordinance, on the
grounds that it denied cattle owners rights of equality and access to the courts; 4 6 and the
Land Claims Court's decision that a community claiming land under the Restitution of
Land Rights Act had failed to prove that their dispossession was the result of
discriminatory laws or practices. 4 7 In each of these cases, the decision of the Court held
important consequences for the relations of power: between men and women living
under indigenous law; between land owners (usually white) and landless or land- hungry
stock owners (usually black); as well as between land owners and land-claiming
communities whose claims did not self-evidently fall within the terms of the Restitution
of Land Rights Act.
In both the Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld cases,
the majority of the Court acknowledged the constitutional status of indigenous law. In
the first instance, the Court struck down a rule of customary law that discriminated on
the basis of gender. In the second instance, the Court held that "indigenous law [is] an
independent source of norms within the legal system," but like all other "law is subject to
the Constitution and has to be interpreted in . . . light of its values." 4 8 The result in Bhe
was for the Court to directly strike down - at least with respect to intestate succession
- the "customary" rule of primogeniture held by many traditionalists and others to be a
key element of the customary legal system. In effect, the Court's decision will have a
profound impact on the rights of wives and daughters who, until now, relied upon the
system of extended-family obligation historically inherent in indigenous law but long
since disrupted by social and economic change. On the other side, the Court's decision in
Richtersveld recognized indigenous law as a source of land rights, thus strengthening the
claims of those who have argued that their land rights - including rights to natural
resources - were not automatically extinguished by the extension of colonial
sovereignty over their territories. Their dispossession - through means other than the
direct application of specific, discriminatory, apartheid land laws - will thus also be
recognized for the purpose of claiming restitution of their land rights. Even if it is not as
broad in its impact, the symbolic value of this recognition of indigenous land rights
makes an important contribution to legitimizing the new constitutional order among
ordinary South Africans.
These and subsequent cases reflect a degree of incorporation but also highlight the
tension between legal pluralism, alive in the recognition of tradition as a source of law,
and the transformative promise of the new constitutional order in South Africa. While
the existence of different symbolic systems represent the disharmonies that Jacobsohn
argues will facilitate and shape the constitutional identity of South Africa, Hirschl hopes
that the institutional resources of constitutionalism, particularly in the shape of a
constitutional court, will provide a means to co-opt or tame the alternative systems of
45. Bhe v. Magistrate,Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Aft.), 2004 SACLR LEXIS 22, at *7-8.
46. Zondi v. Member of the Exec. Councilfor Traditionaland Local Gov'tAffairs 2005 (4) BCLR 347 (CC)
at paras. 1-2 (S. Aft.), 2004 SACLR LEXIS 32, at *5-7.
47. Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (S. Aft.), 2003 SACLR LEXIS 79, at
*8-13.

48. Id. at para. 51.
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symbolic meaning that threaten the dominant vision of constitutionalism. The three
visions of constitutionalism are remarkably consistent in their views of the political
dynamic that underlies the existence of constitutional orders, yet have quite different
notions of the effects that these orders might provide. For Hirschl, constitutionalism,
with its "religion-like nature . . . might very well emerge, or perhaps has already

emerged, as tomorrow's 'opiate of the masses."' 49 For Tushnet, the constitution's
structuring of politics offers an opportunity for popular engagement, and finally for
Jacobsohn, the identification of contending elements within each constitutional order
enables us to understand the role of constitutional identity in shaping processes of
constitutional contestation. It is this latter view that I believe may provide the most
effective tools for exploring the role of constitutions in both comparative and domestic
contexts.

49. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 249.
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